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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of an alleged probation search conducted by the Mini-
Cassia Misdemeanor Probation Department on Gregory John Diagneau. Mr. 
Diagneau was on probation for misdemeanor Driving Without Privileges. (Supp. 
Transcript, P. 9, I. 20) Mr. Diagneau rented a room from his Uncle, the respondent 
Larry Robinson. (Preliminary Transcript, Page 77, I. 11 thru p 78, Line 1) In fact, he 
had informed the probation department that he rented a room there and that the 
probation department knew that fact. (Prelim. Transcript P. 78, II. 2-5). Mr. 
Diagneau's probation agreement with the Misdemeanor Probation Department 
required him to allow a search of his residence upon a reasonable request of his 
probation officer or any peace officer (Clerk's Record, P. 121) 
The Misdemeanor Probation Department decided to do a house visit on Mr. 
Diagneau because he had missed his appointment and had previously tested 
positive for controlled substances. (Supp. Transcript. P. 10, II. 12-17) Because Mr. 
Diagneau tested positive in the past, the Probation Department thought he was using 
controlled substances. (Supp. Transcript, p. 11, II. 9-11) Amber Prewitt asked the 
Rupert Police Department to "go over and do a house visit with (her)." (Supp. 
Transcript, P. 11, I. 1) 
On August 3, 2010, the Probation Department, along with the Rupert Police 
Department, went to Mr. Diagneau's residence. (Supp. Transcript, P. 11, II. 21-25) 
Officer Carsner of the Rupert Police Department approached the front door with 
Officer James Wardle of the Rupert Police Department. (Supp. Transcript, P. 38 LI. 
17-18.) Officer Wardle and Officer Carsner were the first to enter the home and 
began a sweep of the home. It was not until after they had entered and made a 
sweep that Officer Carsner noticed Mr. Diagneau. (Supp. Transcript, P. 40, LI. 7-9) It 
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is obvious that no consent or request was made of Mr. Diagneau. In fact, no consent 
of Mr. Diagneau or request was made of Mr. Diagneau was ever obtained. 
Controlled Substances were then found in the bedroom of the respondent and 
he was charged with possession of a controlled substance in Minidoka County Case 
No. CR-2010-3056. Further, the information found as a result of the search was 
used to get a search warrant for the respondent's residence and more felony 
charges were filed in Minidoka County Case No. CR-2010-4596. 
The Trial court held that the State failed to show that reasonable request was 
made as required by the probation agreement on Mr. Daigneau for a search of the 
home and suppressed the evidence of the search and the subsequent search 
warrant that was obtained. (Clerk's Record, P. 130) 
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court err in granting the respondent's Motion to Suppress? 
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court is to accept the trial 
court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but can freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. 
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression 
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 
weigh evidence, and draw factt.'1al inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. 
Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 
132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court properly applied Turek. The Court of Appeals, in State v. Turek, 
150 Idaho 745, 250 P.3d 796 (Ct. App. 2011) held: 
Because we conclude that the search could not be justified on the 
grounds that it was a reasonable and lawful " visit" and that the inclusion 
of the phrase" at the request of' in the probation search condition 
required that the probation officer notify Turek prior to the search, we 
affirm the district court's grant of Turek's motion to suppress the evidence 
found in his shed. 150 Idaho at , 250 P.3d at 803. 
The present case is exactly on point. The probation agreement required a 
reasonable request in order to justify a search. Paragraph 12 of the Defendant's 
Probation Agreement states "during the term of my probation I WAIVE my Fourth 
Amendment rights to Search and Seizure, based upon a reasonable request of any 
Probation Office and/or Peace O'fficer." 
The necessary request was not made .. The record is clear that police officers 
began the search without first requesting permission of the probationer. The trial 
court did not err. 
The State argues that the request was contemporaneous with the beginning of 
the search. This is not based upon the evidence. The evidence is clear and 
uncontradicted. Police officers entered the home, began searching and then the 
probation officers entered, found Mr. Oiqgneau and began talking with him. It is clear 
from the probation agreement, the request must be made before the search, for it to 
be authorized under the agreement. Therefore, the search was not within the waiver 
of the probationer's Fourth Amendment rights. 
This case can be disting4ished from State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 
182 (Idaho 2009) as Purdum dealt with a probation agreement which did not contain 
the provision for a reasonable request. The Purdum agreement was a blanket 
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waiver of Fourth Amendment rights which is not present here. The requirement that 
the state make a reasonable request prior to the search modifies the reasonableness 
requirement as contained in Purdum or State v. Pinson, 110 Idaho, 718 P.2d 598(Ct. 
App. 1986). 
The trial court did not err in applying Turek. 
B. That State raises issues not presented below. The State argues that the 
search should be upheld because it was protective sweep. This issue was not 
presented below. Issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Therefore, 
the Court should not consider this argument. 
Even if the Court considers this issue, there was no evidence to justify a 
protective sweep. There was no evidence to show that Mr. Diagneau posed a threat 
to the probation officer. State v. Vega, 110 Idaho 685, 718 P.2nd (Ct. App 1986). 
Absent such a showing, the staie had no basis for a protective sweep. Further, no 
one testified or asserted a protective sweep as the basis for the search. From the 
time the officers knocked on the front door, the intent was to conduct a search. 
C . The trial court correctly found that Mr. Diagneau did not have apparent 
authority to consent to the search. Much of the State's argument as to consent and 
scope require the Court to rely upon information obtained after the search began. 
The trial court correctly held that the State did not have sufficient evidence at the 
time the search began that would justify the search. 
The burden is on the State to show that the consent exception applies. State 
v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986). The person giving 
consent to search must have ei~her actual authority to consent or Apparent authority 
that is reasonable upon the circumstances .. State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669, 
674, 904 P.2d 939, 944 (1995). 
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In a case involving common areas, actual authority to consent to a home 
search rests on: 
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of 
the co-inhabitants has the:: right to permit the inspection in his own right 
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might 
permit the common area to be searched. 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 n.7 (1974); 
accord State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 731, 40 P.3d 86, 89 (2002) 
In the present case, at the time the search began, the state made no effort to 
determine what areas were common and which were not. The State bases its 
argument on information obtained as a result of the search or information obtained 
after the search began. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that the 
probationer did not have actual authority to consent to Mr. Robinson's bedroom and 
that there was no apparent authority also. 
The State failed to show that the owner or co-habitant of the home knew of the 
search provisions of the probation agreement or consented to this search. State v. 
Spencer, 139 Idaho 736, 85 P.3d 1135 (Idaho App. 2004), State v. Devore, 134 
Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153 (Ct.App. 2000). The testimony at the hearing showed that the 
owner of the home, Larry Robi~son, was in the process of purchasing the home and 
rented a room to Mr. Daigneau. While the evidence showed that Mr. Robinson 
understood that Mr. Daigneau was on probation, there was no evidence shown that 
he knew of the probation agreement or that he consented to the search of the 
residence. 
Further, the probation agreement can only be used to search the residence of 
Mr. Daigneau. That probation .agreement cannot be used to justify a search of the 
non-probationer's portion of the residence. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Because there was no showing that the State made a reasonable request for a 
search of the Defendant's residence, there is no reasonable request for a search 
based on Mr. Daigneau's probation agreement, the Order granting the Motion to 
Suppress should be upheld. 
. c-)\ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ day of November, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi~"4ay of November, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attorney(s) named below 
in the manner noted: 
X 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, at the post office in Rupert, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the 
attorneys(s) at his office in the address stated above. 
By telecopying copies of the same to said attorney(s) at t11e 
telecopied number(s) ____ , and by then mailing copies of 
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office in Rupert, Idaho. 
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